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CONFLICT: THE BANKRUPTCY ACT v.
STATE STATUTES
by William H. Lake*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Bankruptcy Act' was enacted by Congress pursuant to its
express Constitutional authority to establish "uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States; .. 2
The express grant is "unrestricted and paramount"3 and it "neces-
sarily excludes state regulation."4 "States may not pass or enforce laws
to interfere with or compliment the Bankruptcy Act or to provide addi-
tional or auxiliary regulations."5  The enactment of any federal bank-
ruptcy act thus preempts the field, and supersedes state legislation having
as its object the collection and distribution of the bankrupt's prop-
erty and the discharge of his obligations. Consequently, state statutory
or decisional law which conflicts with the language or purpose of any
single provision of the Bankruptcy Act violates the Constitution's
supremacy clause,6 and is therefore invalid.7
As a direct consequence of such broad federal authority, one of the
most widely litigated areas arising during bankruptcy proceedings in-
volves the conflict between the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act and
state statutes.
The resolution of such state-federal conflicts is best viewed in the
context of the general purposes and workings of the Bankruptcy Act
and its most recent history. In substance, the Bankruptcy Act is de-
signed to serve as both a creditor's and debtor's remedy, though the
* B.A., 1963 (University of California, Los Angeles); J.D., 1966 (Loyola University
of Los Angeles).
1. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 1103 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). [hereinafter
cited as the Bankruptcy Act].
2. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
3. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
7. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
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latter focus is of more recent origin.8 It provides creditors with a
means to collect debts which might otherwise be totally uncollec-
tible, and at the same time provides a vehicle for the honest debtor
to obtain a fresh financial start.9
Precisely because the Bankruptcy Act allows otherwise valid contrac-
tual obligations to be avoided, it has been the object of strong criticism
almost since its inception. 10 In 1971, the Brookings Institute issued
a critical examination of bankruptcy proceedings," adding to the al-
ready large body of opinion attacking the Bankruptcy Act. The Brook-
ings Report recognized bankruptcy as a governmental institution and
emphasized the shortcomings of that statutory creation. In large part
due to the Brookings Report characterization of the bankruptcy system
as "a dreary, costly, slow and unproductive process. . . . [that] is a
shabby and indifferent effort,'1 2 a congressional commission was au-
thorized to review the bankruptcy law."3 An outgrowth of the Commis-
sion's report was congressional introduction of a completely new Bank-
ruptcy Act on January 4, 1977. 4 While the proposed legislation would
8. Prior to the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 only creditors were provided a remedy in
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (1840) (current version at 11 U.S.C.
§§ I to 1103 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
9. The Court's description in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934) of the
Act's purpose as to debtors is illuminating:
One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is "to relieve the honest debtor
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free
from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes."
This purpose of the act . . .give[s] to the honest but unfortunate debtor who
surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy,
a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.
Id. at 244 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
10. See Nims, Representing the Bankrupt, in BANKRUPTCY AND THE CHAPTER PRo-
CEEDINGS 1 (G. Holmes ed. 1976).
11. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEMS, PROCESS, REFORM (1971)
[hereinafter cited as BROOKINGS REPORT].
12. Id. at 197.
13. SJ. Res. 88, 84 Stat. 468 (1970). See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. I & 11 (1973).
14. H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976), was substituted in the House Judiciary
Committee by H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977). On July 19, 1977, H.R. 8200
was reported favorably to the House floor by the House Judiciary Committee. 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., 95 CONG. REc. D1086 (1977). Unfortunately, no further action was
taken prior to the conclusion of the 95th Congress. Nonetheless, H.R. 8200 provides
an insight into likely Congressional action in the 96th Congress. The proposed Bank-
ruptcy Act was designed to streamline bankruptcy proceedings. Among its major changes
H.R. 8200 proposed: (1) establishment of a new court system, independent of its
present status as an arm of the federal court system; (2) establishment of a system of
United States trustees to perform the functions now referred to bankruptcy judges; (3)
[Vol. 10
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have generally streamlined bankruptcy proceedings, congressional inac-
tion on that legislation has left the conflict between the Bankruptcy Act
and state statutes an area of serious dispute. There are three primary
areas where state and federal bankruptcy conflicts arise: (1) between
the definition of the property the trustee in bankruptcy takes under
Section 70(a) 5 of the Bankruptcy Act and state attempts to define such
property; (2) between the Bankruptcy Act and provisions of the Uni-
form Commercial Code;' and (3) between state statutes and the
Bankruptcy Act's policy to allow the bankrupt a fresh start.'
This article will focus on the decisional law in these three areas to
illustrate the problems encountered by the courts in attempting to
reconcile the conflicts between state statutory schemes and the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
II. DEVELOPMENTAL DECISIONS
The focus of much bankruptcy litigation in recent years has been the
scope of the constitutionally based federal authority. Early decisions
had suggested that where state legislation did not have the purpose,
but only the effect, of being inconsistent with federal law, the state
legislation would control. In Reitz v. Mealey,' 8 the Supreme Court ex-
amined New York's motor vehicle financial responsibility law, which
had the effect of frustrating the Federal Bankruptcy Act policy of totally
discharging the debtor's obligations. The Reitz Court found that the
statute constituted a permissible state interference with the effect of
bankruptcy proceedings, insofar as the New York law was an enforce-
able state policy designed to promote highway safety.' 9
Similarly, in Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 0 the majority
found that a Utah financial responsibility law was not designed to aid
in the collection of debts but to enforce a policy against irresponsible
driving.2 1 Thus, the Kesler Court was satisfied that the dictates of the
encouragement of consumer repayment plans; (4) enhanced consumer effectiveness; (5)
redefinition of both consumer and commercial creditors' rights; and (6) facilitation of
business reorganization mechanisms. The bill, if enacted, would have become effective
on October 1, 1978. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 402(a) (1977).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970). See notes 28-80 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 81-140 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 141-173 infra and accompanying text.
18. 314 U.S. 33 (1941).
19. Id. at 37.
20. 369 U.S. 153 (1962).
21. Id. at 174.
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Bankruptcy Act and the Constitution were served as long as the pur-
pose of the state statute was not violative of the supremacy clause.
However, in 1971 the Supreme Court reexamined its position with
respect to state motor vehicle financial responsibility laws and their im-
pact on the Bankruptcy Act, and overturned both Reitz and Kesler in
a decision having broad ramifications. Perez v. Campbell22 invalidated
an Arizona statute which authorized the suspension of an individual's
driver's license and vehicle registration for non-payment of a liability
resulting from an automobile accident, even when that debt had been
discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding. Adopting language from
Hines v. Davidowitz,2" the Supreme Court declared that: "our function
is to determine whether a challenged state statute 'stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives
of Congress'. "24
In rendering its landmark decision in the Perez case, the Court
found: "Kesler and Reitz can have no authoritative effect to the ex-
tent they are inconsistent with the controlling principle that any state
legislation which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is
rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause. '25
The reach of Perez is rflected in Grimes v. Hoschler2 6 where the
California Supreme Court held that sections of the state's Business and
Professions Code permitting suspension of a contractor's license until
debts incurred as a contractor were paid in full, notwithstanding a dis-
charge in bankruptcy, were invalid under the supremacy clause. The
court correctly observed
that the controlling principle is whether a state statute interferes with
and frustrates a federal statute and not merely whether the former is
designed for some conceivable state purpose. In other words, the
existence vel non of a conflict depends on the effect of the state statute
and cannot be determined by a consideration of the purpose.2 7
Since the Perez decision clearly establishes the pre-eminence of the
Bankruptcy Act, courts rendering decisions which involve provisions of
the Bankruptcy Act and provisions of state statutes must first determine
whether or not there is, in fact, a conflict. The practical effect of the
state law must control. It is not necessary that the state statute have
22. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
23. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
24. 402 U.S. at 649 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
25. Id. at 652. See notes 3-7 supra and accompanying text.
26. 12 Cal. 3d 305, 525 P.2d 65, 115 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
973 (1975).
27. Id. at 310, 525 P.2d 65, 67-68, 115 Cal. Rptr. 625, 627-28 (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 10
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a specific purpose to circumvent the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.
Therefore, when courts are analyzing the facts of a particular case to
determine whether or not a conflict exists between the provisions of
the state statute and the Bankruptcy Act, they must look to the ultimate
effect of the state statute and not the state's purpose in enacting the
specific legislation.
III. SECTION 70(a) OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
AND STATE STATUTES
Section 70(a)28 of the Bankruptcy Act provides that the trustee in
bankruptcy is vested with title to the property of the bankrupt as of
the date of bankruptcy (the date the petition is filed). Claims against
such property are first granted to claimants entitled to a priority under
a scheme set forth in section 6429 of the Act, and then on a pro-rata
basis to non-priority unsecured creditors. It is impossible in a limited
discussion to set forth all of the assets which will belong to the trustee;
however, the examination of one such asset effectively illustrates the
conflict between section 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act and state
statutes. Liquor licenses, and the distribution of the assets arising
from their sale, have been the subject of several cases in both the
California courts and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.30
In In re Professional Bar Co., Inc.,"1 the Ninth Circuit upheld the
provisions of section 24049 of the California Business and Professions
Code (B.P.C.)3 2 which authorized the Department of Alcoholic Bever-
age Control (ABC) to refuse to transfer a state-created liquor license
as long as certain state taxes remained unpaid. The court held that no
conflict arose between the B.P.C. and federal bankruptcy law insofar as
28. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970). But see Bankruptcy Act § 6, 11 U.S.C. § 24
(1970), which exempts certain property.
29. 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
30. See In re Professional Bar Co., Inc., 537 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1976); Meyer v.
Bass, 281 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. California, 281 F.2d 726 (9th
Cir. 1960); Gough v. Finale, 39 Cal. App. 3d 777, 114 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1974).
31. 537 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1976).
32. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24049 (West Supp. 1977) provides in relevant part:
The department [Alcoholic Beverage Control] may refuse to transfer any license
whom [sic] the applicant is delinquent in the payment of any taxes due under
the Alcoholic Beverage Tax Law, the Sales and Use Tax Law, or on unsecured
property ... . when such tax liability arises in full or in part out of the exercise
of the privilege of an alcoholic beverage license, or any amount due under the
Unemployment Insurance Code when such liability arises out of the conduct of
a business licensed by the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control.
1977]
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states are entitled to make such licenses conditional and impose transfer
restrictions thereon.
On August 7, 1972, Professional Bar Co., Inc. filed a Chapter XI
proceeding pursuant to section 322 of the Bankruptcy Act. 8 Attempts
at an arrangement were unsuccessful and on December 15, 1973, the
corporation was adjudicated a bankrupt. Among the assets of the
bankrupt were four on-sale general liquor licenses which had been
issued by the state. Pursuant to an order of the bankruptcy judge,
these licenses were sold. Outstanding were approximately sixty-one
labor claims for wages which were filed against the bankruptcy estate
and which were owed to former employees of the bankrupt.
Following the dictates of B.P.C. section 24049, the ABC refused
to transfer the liquor licenses until all of the bankrupt's delinquent state
taxes were paid. The trustee, having no other choice, paid the amount
of the state taxes owed by the bankrupt and it was only after doing so
that the ABC transferred the liquor licenses to their purchasers.
The trustee argued that under both federal and state law qualified
wage claims against a bankrupt estate are entitled to priority over tax
claims of the state. The Ninth Circuit in its decision agreed that this
was true as a general principle. 4  However, the court indicated that
the difficulty centered on defining the nature of the bankrupts property
to which the claims attached. In upholding the ABC's authority to
withhold the transfer of the licenses, the court relied on its earlier de-
cisions in United States v. California" and Meyer v. Bass30 for the
proposition that California was entitled to place a limitation on the value
of a liquor license which it created.8T
The trustee in bankruptcy had alleged that the state statute not only
conflicted with his status under section 70(a), but that it was in conflict
33. 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1970). The section provides that "[ilf no bankruptcy proceed-
ing is pending, a debtor may file an original petition under this chapter with the court
which would have jurisdiction of a petition for adjudication." Id.
34. 537 F.2d at 340 n.1. The court refers to Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11 U.S.C.
§ 104 (1970), and several California statutory provisions in support of this proposition.
See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 1204 (West 1972); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1702 (West
1972); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 6756 (West 1972).
35. 281 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1960).
36. 281 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1960).
37. The court observed that:
Because the state creates and controls its liquor licenses, the terms of any transfer
of a license necessarily remain the prerogative of the state. If the state chooses
to create conditions which make the transfer value of a license a net value after
the state's claims are satisfied, that residual value is all that the trustee may look to.
537 F.2d at 340.
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with the provisions of section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act which estab-
lishes priority of payment to various classes of creditors in connection
with the distribution of the assets of the bankruptcy estate. The
trustee unsuccessfully urged that since under section 64 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act wage claims have a higher priority than state taxes, said
wage claims should be paid ahead of any taxes that may have been
owed by the bankrupt to the state.38 Obviously, the provisions of sec-
tion 24049 of the B.P.C. and section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act are in
conflict with one another. Thus, the court had to pursue some line
of analysis under which the state tax claims could be excused from the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. It did so by defining what constitutes
section 70(a) property in such a fashion as to remove the state creditor
from the operation of the priority scheme set forth in section 64 of the
Act.
Section 24049 of the B.P.C. was clearly designed to permit California
to be paid any taxes owed in connection with the transfer of an asset
(the liquor license) which it had created. It was argued successfully
by the state that since it had created the property which the trustee
took under section 70(a), it had the right to impose any conditions it
chose on the transfer of that asset; notwithstanding the fact that the
value of the asset was lessened as a result.3 9
However, as noted previously,4" the important consideration is not
the intention of the state legislature in enacting a particular statute but
the effect of that statute when it conflicts with a provision of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. Professional Bar makes clear the effect of the California
statute. It creates a priority for the state over the wage claims of the
former employees of the bankrupt. The provisions of section 64 of the
Bankruptcy Act give a higher priority to wage claims than to state taxes.
Therefore, the state B.P.C. provision frustrates the full effectiveness of
the Bankruptcy Act and should have been declared invalid by the court
under the Perez rationale.41 The court's reasoning in Professional Bar
is painfully clear. The claims of the State of California for unpaid taxes
shall take precedence over the unpaid wage claims owed by the bank-
rupt. The state, in the court's apparent view, has the legitimate right
38. Section 64 establishes that the first priority shall be for the expenses of the admin-
istration of the bankruptcy estate; the second and third priorities are awarded to wage
and wage related claims; taxes are relegated to fourth and fifth priority status. 11
U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
39. 537 F.2d at 340.
40. See text accompanying notes 22-27 supra.
41. Id.
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to pay itself first for an asset which it creates, even though this effec-
tively establishes a priority for the state which conflicts with provisions
of the Bankruptcy Act.
The better view is stated by Judge Smith in his dissent.42 In analyz-
ing the facts of the case he determined that there was a clear conflict
between the provisions of section 24049 of the B.P.C. and section 64 of
the Bankruptcy Act and, accordingly, when such a conflict exists the
Bankruptcy Act should govern. Judge Smith recognized the manifestly
inconsistent results of the majority's disregard of Perez.43
Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act mandates that wage earners be
paid first, and section 24049 of the B.P.C. requires that the state should
be paid ahead of all creditors. As Judge Smith stated: "The liquor
license is no more a state created property which the state may regulate
and control without regard to the bankruptcy laws then was the driver's
license in Perez."44
It is illustrative to contrast the Professional Bar decision with a Cali-
fornia appellate court's decision in Gough v. Finale.46 The Gough court
wrestled with the problem created when a licensee enters into an
escrow arrangement with a purchaser and subsequently files a bank-
ruptcy petition resulting in insufficient assets in the estate to pay all
of the bankrupts creditors. Given the conflicting priority systems
established under section 24074 of the B.P.C. and section 64 of the
Bankruptcy Act, Gough held that the distribution of a bankrupt's assets
was governed by the Bankruptcy Act, thereby invalidating the priority
system established by state law. Obviously, it was the state's intention
in Gough, pursuant to its exercise of police powers, to regulate the
manner in which creditors of a liquor licensee may be protected in the
collection of their debts from the proceeds of the sale of a liquor
license. There can be no argument that this is a viable state objective.
It is nonetheless violative of the Bankruptcy Act.
It can be argued that Gough is distinguishable from Professional
Bar on the grounds that the state was not a creditor of the bankrupt
for unpaid taxes and, therefore, Gough did not address the question
of the state imposing restrictions affecting the nature of property which
1
42. 537 F.2d at 340-41.
43. Id. at 341.
44. Id.
45. 39 Cal. App. 3d 777, 114 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1974). Gough focused on B.P.C. §
24074 provisions which set forth a priority system among creditors of a selling liquor
licensee. CAL. Bus. & PROF, CoD § 24074 (West Supp. 1977),
[V/ol. 10
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it created. As applied in Gough, the priority system established by sec-
tion 24074 was to protect creditors other than the state creditors;
citizen-creditors who did not create the asset involved. The effect of
Gough is to direct that citizen-creditors must yield to similarly situated
creditors who have a superior priority under the Bankruptcy Act.
Such an asserted distinction is insufficient, however, as the effect
of the California statute providing for payment of state taxes ahead
of all claimants is to create a system of priorities contrary to those
established by the Bankruptcy Act. It makes no difference that the
state desires to collect its taxes in one case and in the other to protect
citizen-creditors.
Another key case dealing with state statutory restrictions on the
transfer of a liquor license in a bankruptcy proceeding is State Board
of Equalization v. Stodd." This case involved various California agen-
cies which had filed tax claims in a bankruptcy proceeding during the
pendency of which penalties and post bankruptcy petition interest had
accrued. The issue raised was whether or not these state agencies could
apply any of the funds paid by the trustee for pre-petition taxes toward
the payment of penalties and post-petition interest on the delinquent
taxes. The Ninth Circuit held in the negative.47 The trustee had paid
the pre-petition taxes as a necessary condition to the sale and transfer
of the license.
The state agencies conceded that penalties and post-petition interest
are claims which generally cannot be asserted in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. However, they argued that the taxes received from the
trustee for pre-petition tax debts to permit the liquor license transfer
were paid wholly outside the bankruptcy proceedings. Therefore, ap-
plication of such funds by the agencies to post-petition penalties and
interest was not within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.
48
The Court of Appeals dismissed this argument, stating that:
the liquor license and proceeds from its sale were a part of the bank-
rupt's estate, to which title passes to the trusteee under Section 70(a)
(5) of the Bankruptcy Act.
Once funds are part of the bankrupt's estate, they may not be used
to pay penalties and post-petition interest under § 57(j).49
46. 500 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1974).
47. Id. at 1210.
48. Id. at 1209-10.
49. Id. at 1210.
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While the court was not squarely faced with the question raised in
Professional Bar5" regarding the conflict between the priorities estab-
lished by state statute and the Bankruptcy Act, by refusing to permit
the state to collect penalties and post-petition interest, the court in ef-
fect restricted the ability of the state to collect all of the taxes which
it claimed. This result permitted the trustee to transfer the license
without full payment of obligations owed to the state. The Stodd court
seems to recognize the state's right to refuse to transfer a liquor license,
yet upholds the right of the bankruptcy court to determine how the
assets of a bankruptcy estate are to be distributed to the creditors of
that estate.5 The result in Stodd has thereby narrowed the scope of
the decision in Professional Bar.
A. Liens v. Priorities
Before further exploring the section 70(a) property conflict, it is
important to recognize the distinction between liens or security interests
and priorities, 52 since this difference serves as the lynch pin of numer-
ous state/federal conflicts in bankruptcy cases. Moreover, the differ-
ence is essential to the definition of bankruptcy property taken by the
trustee under section 70(a) 3 and often arises in situations involving
liquor licenses.
"[A] priority is merely a right to earlier payment or better treatment
in the administration of an unencumbered estate."5 4 It does not con-
sist of a property interest in particular property, but instead is merely
a right to be given an advantage in the distribution of an insolvent
estate. A lien creditor, on the other hand, is totally outside the purview
of the Bankruptcy Act and therefore the reach of the trustee. While
it is sometimes necessary for a bankruptcy court to determine the
priority among several different liens, the Bankruptcy Act only deals
with lien priorities incidentally and to a very limited extent.
50. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
51. The court attempts to distinguish Professional Bar by observing That "[t]he state
may refuse to transfer the liquor license, but it cannot determine how the assets of
the bankrupt estate should be distributed." 500 F.2d at 1210.
52. See Kennedy, Priorities and Liens, in BANKRUPTCY AND THE CHAPTER PROCEED-
INGs 163 (G. Holmes ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy].
53. Section 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970), provides in
pertinent part:
The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt . . . shall ... be vested by operation
of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition
initiating a proceeding under this title, except insofar as it is to property which is
held to be exempt, to . . . [certain specified] kinds of property wherever
located ....
54. Kennedy, supra note 52, at 167.
[Vol. 10
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The difference between liens and priorities is illustrated in the 1975
Ninth Circuit decision of In re Leslie.5 In Leslie, a tavern owner sold
his business, including his liquor license. California law requires any
seller of a business of that kind to place the proceeds of the sale in
escrow pending consideration of the application for transfer by the
ABC.56 If the ABC approves the transfer, the proceeds are to be
distributed according to a set pattern of distribution.5 7  In Leslie, after
the sale had been approved by the ABC, the seller went into bank-
ruptcy. The trustee in bankruptcy attempted to claim the proceeds
that had been placed in escrow. The applicable statute gave the sellers
of merchandise to the tavern owner a priority over other general un-
secured creditors.58 The supplier-creditors argued that they had a lien
on the proceeds, were entitled to assert their statutorily-created ad-
vantage,50 and were exempt from the provisions of section 64 of the
Bankruptcy Act. The trustee said they had no more than a priority
under state law and could only share pro rata with other unsecured
creditors. 60 As in Professional Bar the Leslie court looked to section
6461 and agreed with the trustee-rejecting the lien-exception argument.
The court reasoned that the federal priority scheme pre-empts distribu-
tion in bankruptcy and that priorities prescribed by state law do not
apply, except for the limited priority afforded a landlord by section
64(a) (5) .62 The supplier-creditors in Leslie were thus not treated as
secured (lien) creditors, and their priority position under state law was
not deferred to under the Bankruptcy Act.63
In reaching this result, the court distinguished an earlier Ninth
Circuit case, United States v. California."4 There, after the sale of a
liquor license, both the federal and state governments asserted tax liens
55. 520 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1975).
56. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24074 (West Supp. 1977).
57. Id.
58. Id. Section 24074 of the B.C.P. accords a priority to "claims for goods sold
and delivered to the transferor for resale at his licensed premises and . . . claims for
services rendered, performed, or supplied in connection with the operation of the licensed
business."
.59. See note 56 supra.
60. 520 F.2d at 762.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
62. Section 64(a) (5) gives a priority to "rent owing to a landlord who is entitled
to priority by applicable State law ... ." but restricts the priority to rent presently
owing which has accrued within three months before the date of the bankruptcy. 11
U.S.C. § 104(a)(5) (1970).
63. 520 F.2d at 762.
64. 281 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1960).
1977]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
against the license. The court of appeals ruled that the state tax credi-
tors had effective liens against the licensee, reasoning that the limita-
tions on the value of the license which had been set by the state limited
the property which became part of the bankrupt estate.", This lien
theory approach to section 70(a) property is similar to the analysis of
the Ninth Circuit in Professional Bar, and consequently, suffers from
the same defects in reasoning.
The Leslie court, shifting as it was its prior analysis, also sought to
distinguish the Supreme Court's decision in Chicago Board of Trade
v. Johnson." That case is primarily significant for its holding that a
seat on a board of an exchange is not property which passes to the trus-
tee in bankruptcy.' The bankrupt in that case owned a seat on the
Chicago Board of Trade. Under the Board rules, if a member owed
money to other members, the Board could prohibit the transfer of that
member's seat to a third person. The trustee in bankruptcy claimed
that he had title to the seat by operation of section 70(a)(5) of the
Bankruptcy Act. Although recognizing that a seat on the Board is nor-
mally property which passes to the trustee in bankruptcy, the court held
that the Board rules gave the member-creditors a secured interest (lien)
in the seat and that title therefore could not pass to the trustee for dis-
tribution to the general creditors of the bankrupt estate.68 It is note-
worthy that unlike the other cases finding such a lien analysis appli-
cable, Chicago Board of Trade did not involve a governmental agency,
but rather a pseudo-governmental creditor. Leslie seems to look to this
distinction in its holding; allowing such pseudo-governmental and gov-
ernmental agencies the right to define section 70(a) property, but with-
holding that right from private creditors.6 9
In order to reconcile these cases, it is essential to examine more
closely the fundamental distinction between a lien and a priority. A
65. The court upheld the state's claim for delinquent taxes in these terms:
fI']he conditions [on licensing] . . . constitute a limitation on the right of the
applicant and upon'the property which that right constitutes and upon the values
which attach to that property. Those values and no greater values became a part
of the bankrupt estate and fell within the reach of the United States.
Id. at 728.
66. 264 U.S. 1 (1924).
67. Id. at 8, 12.
68. Id. at 15.
69. See text accompanying note 54 supra. Secured creditors, however, are not without
limitations in a bankruptcy proceeding. As Justice Douglas stated in Sampsell v. Im-
perial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941), "[tlhe theme of the Bankruptcy
Act is equality of distribution." By contrast, the secured creditors in a bankruptcy
proceeding seek "to avoid that very result." Kennedy, supra note 52, at 170.
[Vol. 10
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creditor who can assert a lien, clearly has a better chance of recovering
what is owed him out of the proceeds of the estate. Despite this ap-
parent basis for distinguishing the aforementioned cases, it is submitted
that neither the creditors in United States v. California nor those in
Chicago Board of Trade v. Johnson actually had valid security interests
in the property claimed by the trustee in bankruptcy. Both courts used
the rationale that since they had created the property rights in the first
place, the creditors claiming superior status over the trustee in each
case could impose reasonable restrictions on the transfer of the prop-
erty.70  Such an analysis ignores the threshold rule that when a bank-
ruptcy takes place and a conflict develops, the court must look to fed-
eral law. By misidentifying the nature of the property, and therefore
misidentifying the asserted claims, both the Ninth Circuit and the
Supreme Court frustrated the purpose and effectiveness of the Bank-
ruptcy Act in that the cases stand in derrogation of the system of priori-
ties created by section 64.
In concluding this analysis of the necessity for a clearer distinction
between liens and priorities in determining what property the trustee
takes under section 70(a), three interesting cases in which a state at-
tempted to create a lien upon the filing of a petition in bankruptcy
should be noted. The courts in these cases held that the assets in-
volved were free and clear of any asserted liens and would be dis-
tributed to the general creditors of the bankrupt estate.
N.W. Day Supply Company v. Valenti 1l reflects the better view.
There, a Massachusetts statute caused a lien to arise in favor of
materialmen upon adjudication in bankruptcy of certain contractors.
The Valenti court stated that "[w]hatever may be the purpose of this
statute, or its effect in other circumstances, it is plainly not within the
70. In Chicago Bd. of Trade, the Court noted that the lien was "inherent in the
property in its creation ..." 264 U.S. at 15. Similarly, in United States v. Cali-
fornia, the Ninth Circuit expressed its rationale as follows:
Here the license existed because the state had issued it. If the licensee acquired
something of value, it was because the state had bestowed it upon him. Whatever
value the license, as property, may have had to a purchaser depended upon its
transferability. If it was transferable, it was because the state had made it so.
If the state had seen fit to impose conditions upon issuance or upon transfer of
property it has wholly created, that is the state's prerogative so long as its demands
are not arbitrary or discriminatory. The federal government has no power to com-
mand the state in this area. It has no power to direct that property be created
by the state for purposes of federal seizure.
281 F.2d at 728. This analysis dovetails with the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Profes-
sional Bar. See notes 38 & 39 supra and accompanying text.
71. 343 F.2d 756 (lst Cir. 1965).
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exceptions permitted to a state to control the distribution of assets in
the hands of the Bankruptcy court.
7 2
The court recognized that the state was attempting to create a lien
for a certain class of creditors (materialmen) so that they would have a
priority over the general creditors of the bankrupt estate. However,
the court looked to the effect of the statute when a bankruptcy was
initiated and correctly determined that the assets of the bankrupt should
be distributed in accordance with the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy
Act.
In re Crosstown Motors, Inc.7n involved another state attempt to
create a lien on the assets of a bankrupt estate in favor of a particular
class of creditors. The issue was whether Illinois law gave an entrustor
a lien on the general assets of a bankrupt, or a priority in payment for
the value of proceeds received from trust sales which were expended
for operating expenses prior to bankruptcy. 4
In examining the statute, the court noted that it should consider "not
only the language used but the evil to be remedied and the object to
be attained."7 5  The court found that it was the intent of the Illinois
legislature to provide for only a priority or preference upon distribution.
Therefore, the claimant was properly denied the status of a lien credi-
tor, and the priorities set forth in section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act pre-
vailed.76 Crosstown Motors thus reemphasizes that the Bankruptcy Act
is superior to any state statute and that a state attempt to create a
priority in favor of a specific class of creditors is invalid when it con-
flicts with the priority provisions enumerated in section 64.
Elliot v. Bumb 77 synthesizes the key issues involved in the establish-
ment of liens and priorities by states. It is perhaps the most illustrative
case to deal with the question of which property rights pass to the
trustee in bankruptcy pursuant to the provisions of section 70(a).
72. Id. at 757.
73. 272 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959).
74. The statute in question provides, in part, that if the proceeds of sales were re-
ceived by the trustee within ten days prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy
by the trustee, or the demand made by the entrustor for prompt accounting, said en-
trustor would be entitled to a priority to the amount of such proceeds or the value
thereof. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121% § 175 (1957) (current version at ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 26, § 9306 (Smith- Hurd 1974)).
75. 272 F.2d at 226 (citing Inter-State Water Co. v. City of Danville, 39 N.E.2d
356, 358 (Il. 1942)).
76. In so deciding, the court noted that the 1938 Bankruptcy Act had eliminated
recognition of state-created priorities, with an exception created for rent. Id. at 227.
See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
77. 356 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1966).
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The Elliott case dealt with a California statute providing that a seller
of money orders to the public was required to retain the proceeds of
money order sales in a special account and that a "trust" would be im-
pressed on these proceeds (as opposed to a lien). Moreover, upon
insolvency of the seller of such money orders, the proceeds of the trust
would go to the issuer of the money order rather than the trustee of
the seller's bankrupt estate.7 8  The Ninth Circuit held that the state
statute did not control, stating:
Congress has made even clearer its intent that state law shall not be
permitted to confer preference on one class of the creditors of one
adjudged a bankrupt under federal law, even though the state may
have the highest public purpose in attempting to do so. So it is that
section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act elimiuates all state-created prior-
ities save one (rent). And statutory liens not accompanied by "pos-
session of" or by "levy upon" the property subject to lien before the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy are invalidated by section 67c(2)
of the Bankruptcy Act.79
The court thus accurately identified the "trust" as a state-created
priority under a different label ° and refused to allow it to thwart the
distributive provisions of section 64. It is implicit from the Elliott
court's disposition of the conflict that even the highest public purpose
on the part of the state would not justify allowing a state-created prefer-
ence to override the federal scheme.
B. Summary
Thus, relevant cases in this area reveal, under the correct analysis,
that property owned by the bankrupt prior to bankruptcy passes to the
bankrupt's trustee pursuant to the provisions of section 70(a) of the
Bankruptcy Act. Further, the property of the bankrupt estate must be
distributed according to the priorities established by the Bankruptcy
Act under section 64 and not according to priorities established by
specific state statutes which conflict with the Bankruptcy Act's system
of priorities. Nonetheless, pseudo-governmental and governmental
78. CAL. FIN. CODE § 12300.3 (West Supp. 1977).
79. Id. at 754-55 (citations omitted). Section 67(c)(2) interrelates with § 64 in
that § 67(c)(2) directs that certain liens may, by order of the court, be preserved for
the benefit of the estate and pass to the tiustee, or be invalidated. The section provides:
"Claims for wages, taxes, and rent secured by liens hereby invalidated or preserved shall
be respectively allowable with priority and restricted as are debts therefor entitled to
priority under. . . section 64 of this Act, even though not otherwise granted a priority."
11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(2) (1970).
80. 356 F.2d at 755.
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entities may be able to successfully remove themselves from the scope
of the Act through the expedient mechanism of asserting a right to
define the nature of such property.
IV. THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AND THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
A frequently litigated issue in bankruptcy proceedings is the conflict
between the Bankruptcy Act and the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.). 1 There are two primary instances when this conflict arises:
(1) when section 9-306 of the U.C.C. conflicts with section 60 of
the Bankruptcy Act; and (2) when section 2-702(2) of the U.C.C.
conflicts with section 67 of the Bankruptcy Act.
A. Section 9-306 of the U.C.C.
Before we can commence a discussion of this conflict a brief ex-
planation of the so-called "avoiding powers" of a trustee in bankruptcy
is useful. The trustee is endowed by Congress with certain powers as
a public officer and as an officer of the court.82 The avoiding powers
of the bankruptcy trustee are the powers to "avoid" transactions be-
tween the bankrupt and another person which were effected before the
filing of a petition by or against the bankrupt under the Bankruptcy
Act. This discussion will focus on the trustee's powers to avoid, nullify,
or otherwise invalidate the bankrupt's pre-bankruptcy transfer of prop-
erty or attempt to prefer one creditor over another by the grant of a
security interest under Article 9 of the U.C.C.
The trustee in bankruptcy is charged by statute to collect as much
as he can for the benefit of the unsecured creditors in a bankruptcy
proceeding. 3 The extent of the trustee's powers can, depending on
the case, exceed the powers of the bankrupt and of actual creditors.8 4
Section 6085 of the Bankruptcy Act enables the trustee to avoid
certain transfers which would otherwise be perfectly valid. As one
commentator has noted, "[t]he basic purpose of section 60 is to cut
off the creditors' race of diligence some four months before bankruptcy,
81. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter referred to as U.C.C.]. All citations
to the U.C.C. are to the 1972 Official Text.
82. Callaghan v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 297 U.S. 464, 468 (1936).
83. Bankruptcy Act § 47, 11 U.S.C. § 75 (1970).
84. See note 86 infra and accompanying text.
85. 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970).
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and to place all creditors on an equal level as of that earlier date." s6
Section 60(a)(1) defines a preference as:
a transfer, . . . of any of the property of a debtor to or for the benefit
of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered
by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing
by or against him of the petition initiating a proceeding under this Act,
the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain
a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the
same class. $7
In other, words, it is a transfer by the debtor to pay or secure a previ-
ously incurred debt. By its terms, section 60 excludes from the defini-
tion of preference such simultaneous transactions as purchases for cash
or security interests given in connection with simultaneous loans.88
However, even a very brief interval between the time the debt was in-
curred and the time the debt was secured or paid will suffice to estab-
lish a non-simultaneous transaction. 9
Under Section 60(b), a trustee may avoid a preference if, at the time
the property was received, the creditor had "reasonable cause to be-
lieve that the debtor . . . [was] insolvent." 90
Section 9-306(2)" 1 of the U.C.C. sets forth the secured party's inter-
ests in "proceeds." Proceeds are defined in section 9-306(1) as
"whatever is received when collateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged,
collected or otherwise disposed of." That section further defines pro-
ceeds in terms of "cash" and "noncash proceeds." "Cash proceeds"
include money, checks and deposit accounts; "non-cash proceeds"
include all other proceeds. Generally, a perfected security interest in
collateral continues in any proceeds received in exchange for the col-
lateral.92 However, this general rule is not applicable in the case of
an insolvent debtor as provided by section 9-306(4)(d) of the U.C.C.
This section purports to give the secured party an interest in com-
mingled proceeds which may or may not have been traceable as pro-
ceeds of the collateral. Thus, this section precludes any claim based
86. Weingarten, The Avoiding Powers of a Trustee in Bankruptcy in BANKRUPTCY
AND THE CHAPTER PROCEEDINGS 129, 151 (G. Holmes ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Weingarten].
87. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1970).
88. Weingarten, supra note 86, at 152.
89. Id.
90. 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1970).
91. U.C.C. § 9-306(2). See generally Note, Secured Transactions in Personal Prop-
erty-Operation of the U.C.C. § 9-304(d) in Bankruptcy, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 508 (1977).
92. U.C.C. § 9-306(3).
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on tracing even if a secured creditor could trace more than is given
to him under the provisions of section 9-306(4)(d) of the U.C.C. It
places a maximum on the sum that can be collected by a secured party
which would be equal to the amount of cash proceeds received in the
ten day period prior to the initiation of a bankruptcy proceeding. The
phrase "proceeds" in section 9-306(4) (d), as recently defined by the
Ninth Circuit, means all cash receipts from any source received by the
debtor in the ten day period prior to bankruptcy.9 3
In a recent decision, In re Gibson Products,94 the Ninth Circuit
was faced with determining the proper relationship between section
60 of the Bankruptcy Act and section 9-306(4) (d) of the U.C.C.
The court held the operation of section 9-306(4) (d) created a void-
able preference under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act,95 thereby
according the federal law the priority which the supremacy clause re-
quires.
The Gibson court explicitly rejected the interpretation of the phrase
"any cash proceeds" which had been given in Fitzpatrick v. Philco
Finance Corp.9 6 There, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the phrase in
conjunction with the definition of proceeds in section 9-306(1) and
limited it to "cash proceeds from the sale of collateral in which the
creditor had a security interest. ' 97  Instead, the court in Gibson
interpreted the phrase "any cash proceeds" as provided for in section
9-306(4)(d) of the U.C.C. to mean all cash receipts from any
93. Arizona Wholesale Supply Co. v. Itule, 543 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 1583 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as In re Gibson Products].
94. Id. The facts of the case are as follows: Gibson Products of Arizona was in-
debted to Arizona Wholesale Supply Co. in the amount of $28,860 for household appli-
ances which Wholesale had sold to Gibson. Wholesale had a perfected security interest
in these appliances.
Gibson filed a petition in bankruptcy on January 13, 1972. In the ten-day period
prior to the filing Gibson deposited $19,505.27 in its bank account, only $10.00 of
which was derived from the sale of an appliance in which Wholesale had a perfected
security interest. Wholesale claimed the entire $19,505.27 under § 9-306(4) (d) of the
U.C.C. in opposition to the claim of the bankruptcy trustee. The bankruptcy court
awarded judgment to Wholesale. The district court affirmed, and the trustee in bank-
ruptcy appealed. Id. at 654-55.
95. The Ninth Circuit held that Wholesales interest in the fund, and its priority
position over later creditors, did not arise until some part of Wholesale's proceeds were
deposited with other cash in Gibson's bank account in the ten days prior to Gibson's
filing the bankruptcy proceeding. Therefore, the transfer on account of an antecedent
debt was received by Wholesale and it could not qualify for the relief provided by
§ 9-306(4). The transfer of the excess proceeds, over and above the amount of proceeds
belonging to Wholesale, was declared by the court as a preference which was avoidable
by the bankruptcy trustee. Id. at 657.
96. 491 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974).
97. Id. at 1292.
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source received by the debtor in the ten day period prior to the filing
of bankruptcy.
Referring to the statute, the court stated that "proceeds" was divided
into two categories, "identifiable and non-identifiable." Non-identifi-
able proceeds essentially referred to proceeds that were commingled
with other proceeds. The extent of the security interest in the "pro-
ceeds" depended upon the category in which they fell. Section
9-306(4)(d) dealt only with non-identifiable cash proceeds. If the
cash proceeds could be identified, meaning they were not commingled,
the secured party would have a perfected security interest in the whole
fund under section 9-306(4)(b) without any of the limitations imposed
by section 9-306(4)(d). U.C.C. section 9-306(4)(d) gives a secured
creditor a security interest even when he cannot identify his proceeds
in the commingled fund, as long as he can show that some of his pro-
ceeds were among those in the fund."' This approach was found ob-
jectionable by the court, since it gave such a creditor a preference
under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act which was otherwise avoidable
by the bankruptcy trustee.99
The court in Gibson observed that the collision between the U.C.C.
and the Bankruptcy Act can be avoided if: "(1) [the creditor's] interest
was initially perfected in the collateral more than four months before
bankruptcy, and (2) he can identify the proceeds to which his security
98. The court stated as follows:
The proceeds section of the Code generally follows the pre-Code law that a
security interest continues in any identifiable proceeds received by the debtor from
the sale or other disposition of the collateral. The Code's new twist is extending
the creditor's security interest to commingled funds without specifically tracing the
creditor's proceeds into the fund, when the debtor has become insolvent.
543 F.2d at 655.
99. The Ninth Circuit discussed the conflict between the preference sections of the
Bankruptcy Act and the provisions of § 9-306 of the U.C.C. as follows:
The effect of Section 9-306(4) is thus to transfer to Wholesale a security interest
in the cash in Gibson's bank account which does not derive from the sale of its
collateral. In this situation, the act that gives Wholesale priority and the events
that attach the security interest to the questioned asset occur at the same time.
The transfer cannot occur earlier than ten days before the institution of bankruptcy.
The transfer of the excess, above the wholesaler's proceeds, is a preference unless
we can say that the transfer was neither for nor on account of an antecedent
debt. We cannot avoid the conclusion that the transfer was on account of an
antecedent debt. Wholesale could not qualify for Section 9-306(4) treatment ab-
sent the antecedent debt; moreover, the transfer does not happen unless the debt
owed exceeds the payments made to the creditor during the ten-day period before
the bankruptcy petition has been filed.
The result is that Wholesale cannot successfully assert its claim under U.C.C.
Section 9-306(4) (d) to thwart the trustees power to set that interest aside as a
preference.
id. at 657.
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interest has attached."'100 The fulfillment of those two predicates will,
in the court's view, entitle that creditor to a priority over later creditors
which "relates back to this initial perfection."'' As seen in Gibson, the
problem arises in these situations involving section 9-306(4) (d) "be-
cause that subsection gives the secured creditor a perfected security in-
terest in the entire amount deposited by the debtor within ten days
before bankruptcy without limiting the interest to the amount that can
be identified as the proceeds from the sale of the creditor's collateral."'1 2
Under U.C.C. section 9-306 (4) (d), a creditor's security interest in these
non-identifiable proceeds arises when the bankruptcy action is begun
and when proceeds from his collateral become commingled with the
debtor's other cash proceeds. Pursuant to section 9-306(4)(d), the
creditor's security interest is held to an "amount not greater than the
amount of any cash proceeds received by the debtor within ten (10)
days before institution of the insolvency proceedings."' 03
Gibson stands for the proposition that the rights provided a secured
creditor by U.C.C. section 9-306(4)(d) will necessarily fall when they
conflict with the "avoiding powers" 0 4 given to a trustee by section 60
of the Bankruptcy Act. °5
One interesting sidelight of the Ninth Circuit's decision in the Gibson
case is its effect on a prior case, DuBay v. Williams.1 6 DuBay dealt
with a conflict between section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act and section
9-108 of the U.C.C. Relying on the state law definition of "antecedent
debt" as indicated in U.C.C. section 9-108, the Ninth Circuit in
DuBay held that the acquisition of new collateral pursuant to an after-
acquired property clause (property acquired within four months of
bankruptcy) was not a preference.' 0 7 This outcome was ill-advised in
that the Ninth Circuit failed to acknowledge the obvious conflict
between state and federal law. While Gibson does not specifically
overrule DuBay, it does significantly limit that case's applicability.
Gibson therefore provides a much-needed corrective to the tendency
100. Id. at 655.
101. Id. Cf. DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969) (when additional
post-petition collateral constitutes accounts receivable and the creditor has fulfilled
U.C.C. filing requirements, a subsequent lien creditor will not gain a priority).
102. 543 F.2d at 655.
103. Id. at 655 (citing U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (d) (1972 version)).
104. See text accompanying notes 82-90 supra.
105. See note 99 supra.
106. 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
107. Id. at 1289.
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on the part of many courts to minimize or ignore the state-federal con-
flict and thereby frustrate the operation of provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
B. Section 2-702 of the U.C.C.
Another dispute arises when section 2-702(2)108 of the U.C.C. is
pitted against the transfer provisions of section 67109 of the Bankruptcy
Act. It is an area in which numerous commentators have disagreed. 110
The U.C.C. was enacted by several states to pre-empt and reorganize
state commercial law and therefore obviously supersedes preexisting
law. The new law has been of great benefit to those engaged in com-
mercial activity. Article 9 has removed from the courts the many dis-
putes involving secured creditors. In this context, it seems highly
inappropriate to attempt to interpret the U.C.C. in general, and resolve
disputes arising under section 2-702(2)1" in particular, by way of pre-
Code statutory and common law as was recently done by the Sixth"1
2
and Ninth Circuits.""
How a seller's rights to reclamation of property under U.C.C. section
2-702 are applicable in a bankruptcy proceeding is of significant impor-
tance. The historical development of the Bankruptcy Act as it impacts
the U.C.C. reclamation provisions provides an insight to the conflict.
Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898114 provided a scheme of priori-
108. U.C.C. § 2-702(2).
109. 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1970).
110. Professor Ven Countryman of Harvard strongly supports the position that
U.C.C. § 2-702 is in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act and is therefore invalid.
Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy, 1 N.M.L. REv. 435 (1971).
Professor Lawrence P. King of New York University and one of the editors of COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY with Countryman, 1-15 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14 ed. 1976), sup-
ports the position of the reclaiming seller. King, Reclamation Petition Granted: In
Defense of Defrauded Sellers, 44 J. NAT'L CONF. OF REFEKRES IN BANKRUPTCY 81
(1970). Finally, Professor Frank R. Kennedy of Michigan University, and also a
COLLIER editor, whose position may be classified as one of moderation, is a strong
supporter of the U.C.C.; but he appears to recognize that the 1966 amendments of §
67(c) of the Bankruptcy Act have seriously limited U.C.C. § 2-702. See Kennedy, The
Interest of a Reclaiming Seller Under Article 2 of the Code, 30 Bus. LAw. 833 (1975).
111. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) provides for the reclamation of property by a seller by stat-
ing:
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while in-
solvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the
receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency had been made to the particular seller
within three months before delivery the ten-day limitation does not apply.
Id.
112. See note 123 infra and accompanying text.
113. See note 128 infra and accompanying text.
114. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, § 64, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (current version at 11
U.S.C. § 104 (1970)).
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ties in disbursing the assets of a bankruptcy estate. Included in the
list of priorities were: "debts owing to any person, . . . who by the
laws of the States . . .in [sic] entitled to priority, . . .,,H During the
ensuing thirty years, the passage of many state priority statutes created
serious problems with the scheme of distribution provided by the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
The Chandler Act of 1938 made substantial amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, including an amendment to section 64.110
The amendment deleted all state created priorities except as to a landlord
who by state statute was entitled to a priority for rent. Sections 67(c)
(1)(A) 117 and 67(c)(1)(B) 1 8 of the Bankruptcy Act also impact the
rights of a reclaiming seller by establishing the trustee's priority over
liens arising out of insolvency and fraudulent transfers.'1"
Congressional action in 1966 repealed the prior explicit recognition
of statutory liens, the House Judiciary Committee finding that such state
created priorities effectively frustrated the distribution provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act.
120
Congress also enacted a definition of "statutory lien" which provided
that:
'statutory lien' shall mean a lien arising solely by force of statute upon
specified circumstances or conditions, but shall not include any lien
provided by or dependent upon an agreement to give security, whether
or not such lien is also provided by or is also dependent upon statute
and whether or not the agreement or lien is made fully effective by
statute.' 12
115. Id. § 64(b)(7).
116. Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 104
(1970)).
117. 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(A) (1970).
118. Id. § 107(c)(1)(B).
119. These sections, as amended in 1966, provide in relevant part:
(c) (1) The following liens shall be invalid against the trustee:
(A) every statutory lien which first becomes effective upon the insolvency of
a debtor. .;
(B) every statutory lien which is not perfected or enforceable at the date of
bankruptcy against one acquiring the rights of a bona fide purchaser from the
debtor on that date, whether or not such purchaser exists ...
Pub. L. No. 89-495, 80 Stat. 268-69 (1966) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 104
(1970)).
120. Id. See also S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess, reprinted in [1966] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2456.
121. Pub. L No. 89-495, 80 Stat. 268 (1966) (current version at Bankruptcy Act
§ 1(29a), 11 U.S.C. § 1(29a) (1970)). Moreover, § 70(c) of the Act, 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(c) (1970), sets forth a priority for the trustee in providing:
The trustee shall have as of the date of bankruptcy the rights and powers of:
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Thus, the backdrop is set for the question: Is the state-created right
of reclamation, provided by U.C.C. section 2-702 which prefers certain
creditors over all others, invalid in bankruptcy? The answer, based on
a threefold analysis, must be in the affirmative. First, the state-created
right of reclamation plainly contemplates a state-created priority to be
paid in advance of dividends to creditors, and thus is contrary to the
scheme of priorities set forth in section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act.
Second, the state-created right of reclamation works as a state-created
lien which first becomes effective upon insolvency, and thus is invalid
in bankruptcy pursuant to section 67(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Act.
Third, the state-created right of reclamation has the effect of a state-
created statutory lien which is not perfected or enforceable at the date
of bankruptcy against one acquiring the rights of a bona fide purchaser
from the debtor on that date, and thus is invalid in bankruptcy pursuant
to section 67(c)(1)(B).
In re Federal's2  presents a thorough documentation of both the
U.C.C. and Bankruptcy Act reclamation provisions. In denying recla-
mation, Judge Brody found that U.C.C. section 2-702, as adopted by
Michigan, conflicted with the Bankruptcy Act. However, on appeal the
Sixth Circuit reversed Judge Brody.' 23 Looking erroneously to pre-
Code state law, the appeals court found that section 2-702 did not
violate the provisions of Bankruptcy Act section 67(c)(1)(A), nor was
the right of reclamation a state-created priority in conflict with section
64 of the Act.
124
In In re Good Deal Supermarkets, Inc.,' the district court, after an
examination of the legislative history,2 6 affirmed the ruling of the
bankruptcy judge denying reclamation pursuant to section 2-702. Like
the district court in In re Federal's, the Good Deal Supermarkets court
found that the seller's right to reclamation established by 2-702 was a
(1) a creditor who obtained a judgment against the bankrupt upon the date
of bankruptcy, whether or not such a creditor exists, (2) a creditor who upon
the date of bankruptcy obtained an execution return unsatisfied against the bank-
rupt, whether or not such a creditor exists, and (3) a creditor who upon the date
of bankruptcy obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings upon all property,
whether or not coming into possession or control of the court, upon which a credi-
tor of the bankrupt upon a simple contract could have obtained such a lien, whether
or not such a creditor exists.
11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
122. 12 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 1142 (E.D. Mich. 1973), affirmed, 17 U.C.C. RFP. SEav.
407 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
123. III Cons. R~ogo. RnP. No. 5, Bankruptcy Court Decisions at 264 (1977).
124. Id. at 272.
125. 384 F. Supp. 887 (D. N.J. 1974).
126. Id. at 888.
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state-created statutory lien in conflict with the statutory lien created
under section 67(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Act.
127
It is clear, despite the misguided view of the Sixth Circuit, that the
provisions of U.C.C. section 2-702 conflict with the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act as they create a disguised state priority in derrogation
of section 67(c)(1) of the Act. Notwithstanding this seemingly ob-
vious conclusion, In re Federal's was not the first decision to uphold the
rights of the reclaiming seller against the bankruptcy trustee when the
provisions of U.C.C. section 2-702 and the Bankruptcy Act came into
conflict.
Perhaps the best illustration can be found in In re Telemart Enter-
prises, Inc.128 Critical analysis reveals the fallacious basis of Telemart.
There is, as reflected in In re Federal's, a clear conflict between section
67 of the Bankruptcy Act and section 2-702 of the U.C.C. When such
a conflict exists the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act must govern. 129
In Telemart, the seller, Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., sold frozen foods and
groceries on credit to Telemart Enterprises. Lewis had delivered this
merchandise throughout the period from August 27 to September
25, 1970. On September 30, having learned of Telemart's Chapter
XI bankruptcy petition, Lewis demanded return of the delivered goods
pursuant to section 2-702 of the U.C.C. The referee in bankruptcy
and the district court refused to permit Lewis to reclaim his goods and
were reversed by the Ninth Circuit.'8 °
The trustee argued that U.C.C. section 2-702(2) was invalid against
him because it was a statutory lien which first became effective upon
the insolvency of the debtor and therefore was invalid pursuant to sec-
tion 67(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Act.
The Ninth Circuit held that the right of a seller, under the U.C.C.,
to reclaim goods received by the buyer on credit while insolvent, does
not have the same effect as a statutory lien first becoming effective
upon the buyer's insolvency. 381
The court stated that the Bankruptcy Act does not prohibit a state
127. Id. See note 122 supra and accompanying text.
128. 524 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1466 (1976). [herein-
after cited as Telemart].
129. See notes 3-7 supra and accompanying text.
130. 524 F.2d at 766.
131. Id. at 763-64.
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from providing for statutory rescission for grounds in addition to those
common law actions such as fraud and misrepresentation. The court
found:
Section 67c is . . . a remedial trimming-back of the special exemp-
tion conferred on statutory liens by section 67b. It was not intended
to serve as a new tool by which the trustee could cut down provisions
of state law obviously not entitled to the benefits of section 67(b).
. . . The sale thus is defective from its inception.1 32
Therefore, even though the court recognized that there was a
conflict between provisions of the Bankruptcy Act and section 2-702
of the California Commercial Code, it upheld the right of a reclaiming
seller against the bankruptcy trustee. Such a position is erroneous, ig-
noring as it does the entire thrust of the supremacy clause, the applica-
tion of which was illustrated in Perez v. Campbell.'33
The court in Telemart attempted to utilize a theory of voidable title
in its interpretation of U.C.C. section 2-702. Such reliance on the title
theory was misplaced by the court. To a great extent the passage of
title which was so important in determining the rights of the parties
under pre-U.C.C. statutes has been abandoned. Indeed, the Official
Comment to U.C.C. section 2-101 expressly rejects the title passage
theory."13 The issue of title is not involved under the U.C.C. and there-
fore should not have been relied upon by the Ninth Circuit in its
decision in the Telemart case.
The proposed revision of the Bankruptcy Act considered by the last
Congress 3 5 contained a provision which dealt specifically with the
132. Id. at 764. The court also noted that its holding allows states to multiply
grounds for rescission, thereby evading § 64:
This loophole is a necessary result of Congress' attempt to promote simultaneously
two conflicting interests: equal distribution of the bankrupt's estate among all gen-
eral creditors and recognition of property interests created by the state. Section 67c
was a result of congressional desire to restrict the state in creation of liens: only
analogous legislation could effect a similar limitation on creation of grounds for
rescission.
Id. at 766.
133. 402 U.S. 637 (1971); see notes 148-156 infra and accompanying text.
134. The arrangement of the present article is in terms of contract for sale and
the various steps of its performance. The legal consequences are stated as follow-
ing directly from the contract and action taken under it without resorting to the
idea of when property or title passed or was to pass as being the determining
factor. The purpose is to avoid making practical issues between practical men
turn upon the location of an intangible something, the passing of which no man
can prove by evidence and to substitute for such obstructions proof of words and
actions of a tangible character.
U.C.C. § 2-101, Comment.
135. See note 14 supra.
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limitation on the various avoiding powers of the bankruptcy trustee and
might have resolved the U.C.C. section 2-702 conflict by adopt-
ing much of the language of the U.C.C. reclamation provision.136
However, it should be noted that during Committee consideration of
H.R. 8200137 a new provision, section 549 of the bill, was added which
provided for discretionary judicial authority to deny reclamation and
grant the same priority as is presently mandated by section 64 of the
Bankruptcy Act.""8
Notwithstanding this potential relief from the above described statu-
tory conflict, it is evident that under existing law the right created by
a state in enacting U.C.C. 2-702 is a lien that only becomes effective
upon the insolvency of the debtor. Such a right or lien is in clear con-
flict with sections 1(29a), 67c(l)(A), and 67c(l)(B) of the present
Bankruptcy Act, and any state legislation which frustrates the full effec-
tiveness of the Bankruptcy Act should be rendered invalid.
This view was most recently espoused in Samuels & Co., Inc.Y30
While the bankruptcy trustee was not involved in the action, Samuels
affirms the superiority of the Bankruptcy Act over U.C.C. section
2-702 creditors. Samuels involved a conflict between U.C.C. Article
9 and Article 2 creditors asserting rights to the same goods in bank-
ruptcy. In finding the perfected security interest of the Article 9
creditor superior to the creditor claiming under 2-702, the court
analogized the Article 9 creditor's rights to the priority afforded the
bankruptcy trustee under section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act. Thus,
Samuels would appear to place the Fifth Circuit with Good Deal Super-
markets in upholding the superiority of the Bankruptcy Act, referring
to the bankruptcy trustee as having the "status of a hypothetical lien
creditor" under section 70(c). °
136. H.R. 8200 § 546(b) provided:
The rights and powers of the trustee under . . . this title are subject to any
statutory right or common-law right of a seller, in the ordinary course of such
seller's business, of goods to the debtor to reclaim such goods if the debtor has
received such goods on credit while insolvent, but-(l) such a seller may not
reclaim any such goods unless such seller demands reclamation of such goods within
ten days after receipt of such goods by the debtor;...
137. See note 14 supra.
138. H.R. 8200 § 549(a)(2)(B) provided that the trustee may avoid a transfer of
the property of the bankrupt estate which "is not [otherwise] authorized . . . by the
court."
This provisi6n may well have been added to cover the situation where the debtor
sold the goods to another within the ten day reclamation period, or to allow for court
intervention dependent upon the nature of the goods.
139. 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976).
140. Id. at 1248.
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V. THE BANKRUPTCY ACT'S POLICY TO ALLOW THE
BANKRUPT A FRESH START
The significant impetus to seek relief through a voluntary petition
in bankruptcy is the availability of a discharge from the bankrupt's obli-
gations. Absent such a discharge bankruptcy proceedings are mean-
ingless to the debtor. A discharge in bankruptcy essentially means that
any monetary obligations owed by the bankrupt to a particular creditor
are no longer enforceable, thus enabling the bankrupt to start with a
"clean slate." Therefore, if an individual contemplates filing bank-
ruptcy, it must be determined whether or not he will be entitled to a
discharge and what debts, if any, will not be affected by the dis-
charge.'
41
Such a determination is facilitated by a study of sections 14(c)(1)
through 14(c)(8) 14 2 of the Bankruptcy Act which set forth the basis
for the refusal of a discharge.143 In addition, an examination of section
17144 reveals that certain obligations such as federal or state taxes in-
curred three years prior to bankruptcy and claims based upon fraudulent
conduct, are not dischargeable in bankruptcy even though the bank-
rupt may obtain a general discharge.
Prior to 1971, the bankrupt was faced with a problem of obtaining
a "fresh start" despite his having obtained a discharge in bankruptcy,
when he had judgments outstanding against him that arose out of an
automobile accident case. Although such judgments were theoretically
dischargeable in bankruptcy, many states had so-called "financial re-
sponsibility laws" which provided that a bankrupt's driver's license
could be suspended for failure to pay certain debts. 45 The states jus-
tified the enactment of such legislation on the ground that it was neces-
sary to protect their citizens by permitting only financially responsible
141. See Brody, Discharge, Debts Excepted from Discharge and Related Problems,
in BANKRUPTCY AND THE CHAPTER PROCEEDINGS 95 (G. Holmes ed. 1976) [hereinafter
cited as Brody].
142. 11 U.S.C. §§ 32(c) (1)-32(c) (8) (1970).
143. See Brody, supra note 141, at 95-96 for a succinct summary of the grounds
for denial of a discharge in bankruptcy.
144. 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1970).
145. See, e.g., Uniform Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, Aaiz. REv. STAT.
§ 28-1163 (1976); CAL. VEH. CODE § 16372 (West 1971); Safety Responsibility Law,
ILL. REV. SrAT. ch. 7, §§ 7-100 to -503 (Smith & Hurd 1971); N.J. REv. STAT. §§
39:6-23 to -104 (1973); Financial Security Act, N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 310 to 321
(1970); Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. H5 4509.01
to .78 (Anderson 1973).
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persons to drive.' 46 Prior to 1971, the Supreme Court had held that
such legislation was not in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act. 147  In the
landmark case of Perez v. Campbell,4 " however, the Supreme Court
overruled prior cases permitting the states to enforce such legislation
and held that the suspension of a driver's license for failure to pay a
discharged debt frustrated the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act.140
Perez provides an excellent dissertation on the ability of a bankrupt to
obtain a "fresh start" when he files a petition in bankruptcy, and also
sets forth the general position of the Court with regard to the conflict
between provisions of a state statute and the Bankruptcy Act. Signifi-
cantly, Perez holds that any state law that frustrates the purposes and
full effectiveness of the Bankruptcy Act is unenforceable. 150
The factual context of Perez warrants examination. Perez was an
uninsured motorist involved in an automobile accident. He was sued
in an Arizona state court for personal injuries and property damage sus-
tained in the accident. A judgment for over $2,400 was entered
against him.' 8' Subsequently, Perez filed a petition in bankruptcy list-
ing that judgment among his debts; thereupon, the bankruptcy court
entered a discharge from all of his debts, including the auto accident
judgment. Under Arizona's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility stat-
ute, the fact that a judgment against a motorist remained unsatisfied
for sixty days was a ground for suspending the motorist's license and
registration, even if the motorist received a discharge in bankruptcy fol-
lowing such judgment.152  Pursuant to these statutory provisions,
Perez's registration and license were suspended. In support of his
complaint, the bankrupt filed an affidavit stating that the suspension
of the registration and license worked both a physical and financial
hardship upon him and his children.
Relying upon Kesler'53 and Reitz,8 4 the Ninth Circuit affirmed
146. See Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941) and discussion accompanying note
18 supra.
147. See notes 18-22 supra and accompanying text.
148. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
149. The same rationale provided the basis for the decision in Rutledge v. Shreve-
port, 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 477 (W.D. La. 1975), wherein the court held that a police
officer could not be dismissed for filing a petition in bankruptcy. Similarly, in In
re Weitzen, 3 F. Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), the court held that an agreement to
waive the benefits of the Bankruptcy Act is unenforceable.
150. 402 U.S. at 652.
151. Id. at 638.
152. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 28-1163 (1976).
153. See notes 18-22 supra and accompanying text.
154. Id.
[Vol. 10
BANKRUPTCY ACT v. STATE STATUTES
the district court's rejection of the contention that the Arizona statute
was in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act.155 On certiorari, the Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that the statute had the effect and
purpose of frustrating federal law under the Bankruptcy Act and was
thus invalid under the supremacy clause.1
This Supreme Court decision illustrates the analysis required to
determine whether a state statute conflicts with a federal statute, stat-
ing: "Deciding whether a state statute is in conflict with a federal stat-
ute and hence invalid under the Supremacy Clause is essentially a two-
step process of first ascertaining the construction of the two statutes and
then determining the constitutional question whether they are in
conflict."' 57
The Arizona statute was designed to protect automobile users from
faultless loss occasioned by financially irresponsible motorists. Its
purpose was to provide "leverage for the collection of damages"'158 from
such motorists. Conversely, the Bankruptcy Act was designed to pro-
vide debtors "a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future
effort, . . ... "' In juxtaposing these two purposes the Perez Court
found that the scope of the Bankruptcy Act included "preexisting tort
judgments."' 60  Consequently, the Arizona statute fell as having an ef-
fect which violated the superior federal purpose. Perez mandates the
examination of the effect, as well as the purpose of the statute when
the bankrupt asserts the defense of a state conflict with the Bankruptcy
Act. No matter how otherwise laudatory the state's intention, its legis-
lative efforts will be invalidated if such statutes run contrary in their
effect to the Bankruptcy Act's purpose of providing debtors a fresh
start.' 61
The Ninth Circuit decision in In re Kanter"'62 is instructive of the
problems encountered in the clash between the Bankruptcy Act's
fresh start policy and state statutes. In Kanter the Ninth Circuit was
155. 421 F.2d 619 (1970).
156. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
157. Id. at 644.
158. Id. at 646.
159. Id. at 644 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934)).
160. Id.
161. See also Grimes v. Hoschler, 12 Cal. 3d 305, 525 P.2d 65, 115 Cal. Rptr.
625 (1974), discussed at text accompanying notes 26-27 supra, which follows the Perez
analysis. Grimes overrules the prior California case of Tracy v. Contractors' State
License Bd., 63 Cal. 2d 598, 407 P.2d 865, 47 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1965).
162. 505 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1974).
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faced with what seemingly were two conflicting purposes of the Bank-
ruptcy Art. The first being the Act's objective to give a bankrupt a
fresh start once he has obtained his discharge in bankruptcy; the
second being the policy of equal distribution of assets to all creditors
by enabling the trustee to take title to the bankrupt's property pursuant
to the provisions of section 70(a) (5).'6
The question before the court was whether section 688.1(b)
164 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure so frustrated the full effective-
ness of section 70(a)(5) and section 70(c)'65 of the Bankruptcy Act
that it was rendered invalid. The Ninth Circuit found that the Califor-
nia law conflicted with the Bankruptcy Act and declared the state
provision unconstitutional.'
Kanter sustained injuries in an automobile accident in March of
1970. In March of 1971 he filed suit for damages in the state court
and two weeks later filed a bankruptcy petition. The trustee asserted
that the personal injury lawsuit was an asset of the bankruptcy estate
and sought a determination to that effect by the bankruptcy judge.
The bankruptcy judge concluded that tifle to the personal injury action
vested in the trustee regardless of the California provision and his
decision was affirmed by the district court.
167
The enactment of section 688.1 followed the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Carmona v. Robinson,' wherein it was held that the predecessor to
section 688.1 permitted a trustee in bankruptcy to include a personal
injury action of the bankrupt among the assets of the bankruptcy estate
163. 11 U.S.C. § I10(a)(5) (1970). Section 70(a) of the Act provides in relevant
part:
The trustee . . . shall in turn be vested by operation of law with the title of
the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition initiating a proceeding
under this Act, except insofar as it is to property which is held to be exempt,
to all of the following kinds of property wherever located . . . (5) property, in-
eluding rights of action, which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any
means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold under
judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered: Pro-
vided, That rights of action ex delicto for . . . injuries to the person of the bank-
rupt . . . shall not vest in the trustee unless by the law of the State, such rights
of action are subject to attachment, execution, garnishment, sequestration, or other
judicial process ...
164. CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 688.1(b) (West Supp. 1977), as amended by Law of
Sept. 19, 1970, ch. 1523, § 7.5 (1970) Cal. Stat. 3069, provides in relevant part:
"Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit an assignee by operation of law
of a party to a personal injury action to acquire any interest in or lien rights upon
money recovered by such party for general damages."
165. 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
166. 505 F.2d at 231.
167. 345 F. Supp. 1151 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
168. 336 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1964).
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pursuant to section 70(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act. Subsequent to
Carmona the California legislature amended the law in an attempt to
deny this right to the bankruptcy trustee, by adding subsection b to
former section 688.1.19
In Kanter, the Ninth Circuit discussed section 6170 of the Bankruptcy
Act which, in essence, states that the estate of the bankrupt does not
include property which is exempt under state law. The section also
permits a state to amend its law to expand the classes of property which
are exempt from the claims of creditors in conformity with the fresh start
policy of the Bankruptcy Act. If a state desired to expand its ex-
emption provisions, this would remove the exempted property from the
reach of the trustee in bankruptcy. Consequently, certain property will
not pass to the trustee by operation of law under section 70(a)
insofar as section 6 of the Act recognizes specific property which
may be exempted by the state. However, the Ninth Circuit held
that California's section 688.1 (b) was not an exemption statute,
pointing out that it was not Congress' intent to "provide the states with
a free hand to circumscribe the powers of the bankruptcy trustee."'171
The court then reviewed the Perez decision, specifically emphasizing
the Supreme Court's two-step analysis for determining whether a state
statute conflicts with the Bankruptcy Act. The court reflected upon
the fact that one of the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is "to bring
about a ratable distribution among creditors of a bankrupt's assets; to
protect the creditors from one another' 1 2 and to secure the assets of
the estate for such creditors.
In examining section 688.1(b) the Ninth Circuit found it "an
obstacle"'173 to the full enforcement of congressional purposes, since its
effect is to deny certain assets of the bankruptcy estate to the trustee
which would otherwise be included.
The Kanter case sets out the interplay of various provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act, and their application in the context of a bankruptcy
169. See note 164 supra.
170. 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
171. 505 F.2d at 230. The Kanter court found that § 688.1(b) was not "a general
exemption provision' of the kind envisioned by the Congress in enacting § 6 of the
Bankruptcy Act, but rather "specifically permits judgment creditors to obtain a lien on
a debtor's cause of action, and only limits the power of an 'assignee by operation of
law,' a term intended to reach the trustee in bankruptcy. Hence it cannot be an ex-
emption provision within the meaning of § 6 and 70, sub. a." Id. at 230-31.
172. Id. at 231.
173. Id.
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proceeding involving a conflicting state statute. The California legisla-
ture was trying to do indirectly what it could not do directly. It clearly
objected to personal injury judgments passing to the trustee in bank-
ruptcy pursuant to section 70(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, and there-
fore enacted section 688.1(b) of the Civil Procedure Code. The Ninth
Circuit simply would not permit such an attempt to circumvent the pur-
poses of the Bankruptcy Act under the guise of implementing the fresh
start policy of the federal statute.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have examined three of the primary areas involving conflicts
between the Bankruptcy Act and state statutes: (1) the conflict be-
tween the definition of property the bankruptcy trustee takes pursuant to
section 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act and state attempts to define such
property;174 (2) the conflict between the Bankruptcy Act and some
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code; 17 5 and (3) the conflict
between state statutes and the Bankruptcy Act's policy to allow the
bankrupt a fresh start. 76  The common theme running through all
three areas is that the paramount consideration is the effect a specific
state statute has on the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. If that effect
conflicts with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, the provisions of
the Act will and should govern, whether the conflict arises in the
context of specific definitional constructs or in the more general
application of collateral statutes. Problems arise not from any dis-
pute as to this basic principle, but from the sometimes confused
analysis utilized by the courts in defining and distinguishing specific
types of creditors. This results in the failure to recognize inherent
conflicts between state definitional statutes and the Bankruptcy Act.
Particularly with respect to the Uniform Commercial Code, absent
federal statutory reform, it may well be left to the Supreme Court to
provide the direction necessary to resolve these conflicts.
174. See notes 28-80 supra and accompanying text.
175. See notes 81-140 supra and accompanying text.
176. See notes 141-173 supra and accompanying text.
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